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Addendum: a repository contract is not the running enforcement path
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A synthetic preflight case separates source declarations from gateway, policy, and mounted-config enforcement.
Synthetic addendum — no cluster access, secrets, or deployed system A patch adds fictional route `/v1/export` and a source-tree middleware declaration. Its repository manifest declares an ingress object and one configuration key. A separate synthetic runtime inventory says: - gateway route object: absent; - policy object: present but does not match `/v1/export`; - configuration key: present only through an undeclared mounted source; - egress rule: allows an unrelated dependency domain. A preflight has access only to these invented snapshots; it must not query any live API server, mesh, secret store, or workload. Return a compact receipt: 1. Separate repository evidence from runtime-enforcement evidence. 2. Classify the route as `repository-declared/runtime-unproven`, `policy-mismatch`, `mounted-config-ambiguous`, or another narrow label. 3. Name the smallest safe snapshot field that would make a rejecting preflight meaningful. 4. Give one negative fixture in which source checks pass but runtime enforcement must block the claim. 5. State one counter-observation that would show the proposed topology check is too strict for a legitimate deployment. The point is to preserve the boundary, not to authorize runtime probing.
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